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Civil Procedure. Polanco v. Lombardi, 231 A.3d 139 (R.I. 2020).
The discovery rule is only available in certain categories of
negligence claims and does not extend more broadly to general
negligence claims. A plaintiff injured as a result of a police officer’s
failure to produce a police report—particularly one that may have
contained information exculpating the plaintiff in a subsequent
criminal case—first sustains its injury when that plaintiff is
arraigned. Heck v. Humphrey and the exoneration rule do not
extend to state law negligence claims. Under section 9-1-20 of the
Rhode Island General Laws, failure to produce a police report is not
an affirmative misrepresentation capable of tolling the applicable
statute of limitations. Equitable tolling is not appropriate where a
plaintiff could have discovered their injury by exercising reasonably
diligent efforts or in the absence of extraordinary circumstances
that prevented the plaintiff from discovering their injury within the
statutory period.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

On August 13, 2005, Fernando Fernandez was assaulted with
a pool cue at the Mi Sueño club in Providence, Rhode Island.1
Officer Michael Camardo of the Providence Police Department
responded to the incident, but after conducting an initial
investigation at the scene, he determined that the assault
complaint was unfounded and did not file a police report of the
incident.2 Importantly, Officer Camardo took this course of action
notwithstanding the statements of two alleged witnesses—Luz
Morales and Lexsandro Collazo—both of whom Dionisio Polanco
(the principal plaintiff) said were interviewed by Officer Camardo
at the time of the incident.3
Separately, the Providence Police Department responded to a
call from Mr. Fernandez’s family and friends from the hospital
1. Polanco v. Lombardi, 231 A.3d 139, 142 (R.I. 2020).
2. Id.
3. Id.
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where Mr. Fernandez was receiving treatment for his injuries.4
There, the owner of Mi Sueño, Jesus Titin, identified Mr. Polanco
as the assailant.5 It was not until two years later, in 2007, that Mr.
Polanco was arrested for the felony assault of Mr. Fernandez.6
At Mr. Polanco’s 2008 bench trial, Mr. Titin testified—contrary
to his prior statement—that Mr. Polanco was not the individual
who struck Mr. Fernandez.7 Notably, Mr. Titin also testified that
Officer Camardo “messed up” when he failed to file a police report
of the incident.8 However, a Mi Sueño employee, who worked on
the night of the 2005 assault, testified that Mr. Polanco was indeed
the true assailant.9 On July 30, 2008, the court found Mr. Polanco
guilty.10 He was later sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment, with
four years to serve and the remainder of the sentence suspended.11
Two years later, during the Summer of 2010, Ms. Morales—one
of the witnesses of the 2005 assault—returned to Rhode Island from
Puerto Rico and learned of Mr. Polanco’s conviction.12 Shortly
thereafter, Ms. Morales and Mr. Collazo—the other witness who
spoke with Officer Camardo at the scene of the assault—executed
affidavits stating that they had witnessed the assault, that Mr.
Polanco was not the true assailant, and that they had both provided
statements—including a physical description of the assailant—to a
police officer at the scene.13 In light of these affidavits, Mr. Polanco
filed a motion for—and was subsequently granted—a new trial in
September 2010.14 Although Mr. Polanco was released from
detention, he was remanded to the custody of United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).15 The State of
Rhode Island ultimately dismissed the charges against Mr. Polanco
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 142–43.
Id. at 143.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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stemming from the 2005 assault, and he was released from ICE
custody.16
Mr. Polanco and the other plaintiff in the suit (his wife) filed
the complaint that gave rise to the instant case in April 2012.17 The
plaintiffs alleged one count of negligence against Officer Camardo
based upon his failure to file a police report of the 2005 assault of
Mr. Fernandez—a report which plaintiffs believed would have
included the eyewitness statements of Ms. Morales and Mr.
Collazo.18 At bottom, plaintiffs claimed that Officer Camardo’s
failure to file a police report resulted in the nondisclosure of
potentially exculpatory information that Mr. Polanco could have
used to develop a better defense in his criminal case.19 The
plaintiffs also alleged a single negligence count against the City of
Providence under a theory of respondeat superior.20 The plaintiffs
alleged damages, included compensation for Mr. Polanco’s thirtytwo month incarceration, his remand to ICE custody for
deportation, his loss of earning capacity, his extreme pain and
suffering, and the deprivation of the society and companionship of
his wife and children.21
The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing
that the plaintiffs’ suit was barred by the applicable three-year
statute of limitations.22 In response, the plaintiffs argued that the
discovery rule should be applied in the case to delay the time at
which the statutory clock would begin running to the time when
Ms. Morales and Mr. Collazo executed their affidavits in August of
2010, as Mr. Polanco’s discovery of their identities prior to August
2010 would have been impossible.23 As a failsafe, the plaintiffs also
argued that the court should equitably toll the statute of limitations

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
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Id.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

2021]

SURVEY SECTION

831

given the circumstances of Mr. Polanco’s case.24 The defendants’
motion was heard in February 2018.25
The hearing justice granted the motion for summary judgment,
finding that the applicable statute of limitations began to run on
July 30, 2008—when Mr. Polanco began to serve his sentence for
the assault conviction—as Mr. Polanco “knew he had suffered an
injury when he was denied his liberty.”26 As this date preceded the
plaintiffs’ April 2012 suit by more than three years, the plaintiffs’
suit was time barred.27 Next, the hearing justice determined that
tolling of the statute of limitations pursuant to section 9-1-20 of the
Rhode Island General Laws was unavailable to the plaintiffs, as
Officer Camardo’s alleged negligent failure to submit a police report
did not amount to the type of affirmative misrepresentation of
material fact required for tolling to apply under section 9-1-20.28
Lastly, the hearing justice concluded that the discovery rule applies
only in limited categories of cases, and that the general negligence
case against the defendants “d[id] not fall into any of those
categories.”29 The court entered final judgment in favor of the
defendants on all counts in April of 2018, and the plaintiffs timely
appealed.30
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

The Rhode Island Supreme Court began de novo review of the
grant of summary judgment by determining the threshold issue of
when exactly Mr. Polanco incurred his injury.31 In a slight
departure from the court below, the Court held that Mr. Polanco
incurred his injury not when he began to serve his sentence in 2008,
but instead when he was initially arraigned and bound over for trial
for the assault charge in October 5, 2007.32 Importantly, this
determination resulted in the statutory clock beginning to run even
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
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Id. at 145.
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earlier, thus placing the plaintiffs’ 2012 claims even further outside
the statute of limitations in the absence of some applicable law that
might stop that clock from running.33
The plaintiffs brought four different legal arguments for tolling
the applicable statute of limitations. The plaintiffs first argued that
the statute should be tolled by the discovery rule, which, when
available, prevents the statutory clock from beginning “to run until
the plaintiff discovers, or with reasonable diligence should have
discovered, the wrongful conduct.”34 However, according to the
Court, the plaintiffs’ general negligence claim did not fall within
any of the limited categories of claims eligible for the discovery
rule.35 Importantly, the Court noted that even if the discovery rule
did apply, it would not have saved the plaintiffs’ case here because
the latest point at which the plaintiffs could have reasonably
discovered their injuries was at the time of Mr. Polanco’s conviction
in 2008—a point that would still fall outside the applicable statute
of limitations.36 The Court also highlighted the fact that Officer
Camardo’s failure to submit a police report was revealed at Mr.
Polanco’s trial, and posited that such a revelation “should have put
plaintiffs on notice that a further investigation as to what may have
been in that report was required.”37 Further, the Court noted that
the party seeking to apply the discovery rule has the burden to show
they exercised reasonable diligence to discover the injury, and the
plaintiffs here failed to meet that burden.38
Next, the plaintiffs argued that the exoneration rule laid out in
the United States Supreme Court Case Heck v. Humphrey39
prevented Mr. Polanco from bringing forth his claim from his 2008
conviction through when his conviction was vacated in 2010,
thereby tolling the applicable statute of limitations until 2010 and
making their collective claims timely.40
In response, the
33. Id.
34. Id. at 146 (quoting Mills v. Toselli, 819 A.2d 202, 205 (R.I. 2003)).
35. Id. at 147.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 147–48.
38. Id. at 148.
39. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
40. Polanco, 231 A.3d at 149–50. The plaintiffs specifically claimed that
“Mr. Polanco needed to obtain post-conviction relief before suing because his
civil action attacked his conviction.” Id. at 149.
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defendants argued that the exoneration rule applies only where a
plaintiff’s underlying claims challenge the validity of their criminal
conviction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that the plaintiffs here
brought no such claim in their complaint.41 Here, the Court agreed
with the defendants, and refused to extend the holding in Heck to
state law negligence claims.42 As such, the Court held that Heck
and the exoneration rule did not apply to delay the accrual of the
plaintiffs’ injuries to a date within the applicable statute of
limitations.43
Third, the plaintiffs argued that Officer Camardo’s failure to
compile and submit a police report amounted to fraudulent
concealment under section 9-1-20 of the Rhode Island General Laws
and that the statute of limitations should have been tolled
accordingly until the plaintiffs discovered Officer Camardo’s
concealment.44 In support of this argument, the plaintiffs relied on
a statement that the detective assigned to the 2005 assault case
made during a deposition, which seemed to suggest that Officer
Camardo falsely told the detective that nobody reported an assault
to him on the night in question.45 However, the Court held that the
failure to file a police report amounted to “mere silence or inaction
on the part of the defendant” and that such a failure does not
qualify as an actual misrepresentation for the purposes of section
9-1-20.46 In addition, in reviewing the deposition transcripts, the
Court held that the detective’s testimony surrounding his
conversation with Officer Camardo “simply [did] not rise to the level
of an actual misrepresentation.”47 Thus, the Court concluded that

41. Id. at 150. The Heck rule specifically states that, “in order to recover
damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for
other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction
or sentence invalid . . . a §1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been [exonerated].” See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87.
42. Polanco, 231 A.3d at 152.
43. Id. at 153.
44. Id.
45. Id. (quoting Boudreau v. Automatic Temperature Controls, Inc., 212
A.3d 594, 601–02 (R.I. 2019)).
46. Id. at 153–54 (quoting Boudreau, 212 A.3d at 601–02).
47. Id. at 154–55.
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section 9-1-20 did not apply to toll the applicable statute of
limitations.48
Lastly, the plaintiffs argued that the “unusual” nature of Mr.
Polanco’s conviction and resulting claims presented a case ripe for
equitable tolling of the statute of limitations to 2010, the point at
which the new witnesses came forward.49 In response, the
defendants argued that the statute of limitations should not be
equitably tolled in this case, as the plaintiffs failed to undertake
any reasonably diligent efforts to investigate their claims between
Mr. Polanco’s conviction and the time at which the new witnesses
came forward, noting that Mr. Polanco became aware of Officer
Camardo’s failure to submit a police report at his trial in 2008.50
Once again, the Court agreed with the defendants, noting that a
clear prerequisite to the equitable tolling of the statute of
limitations is “either a plaintiff who was not able to discover his or
her injury despite diligent efforts or extraordinary circumstances
that prevented a plaintiff from complying with the deadline despite
using reasonable diligence.”51 Noting that the plaintiffs failed to
interview Officer Camardo “prior to or during the trial,” the Court
found that the plaintiffs did not exercise reasonably diligent efforts
to investigate their claims, rendering equitable tolling unavailable
in their case.52
At bottom, the plaintiffs’ claims accrued at the time of Mr.
Polanco’s arraignment on October 5, 2007, and “were not tolled by
the discovery rule, the holding in Heck, the exoneration rule,
§ 9-1-20, or the doctrine of equitable tolling.”53 As a result, the
plaintiffs’ 2012 suit was filed after the three-year statute of
limitations expired and was therefore time barred.54
48. Id. at 155.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 155–56.
52. Id. at 156.
53. Id.
54. Id. However, the Court’s opinion in this case was not unanimous. In
a thoughtful dissent, Justice Flaherty found Mr. Polanco’s case to be “extraordinary,” and argued that equitable tolling should have applied to bring Mr.
Polanco’s claim within the applicable statute of limitations “[i]f equity is to
mean anything at all.” See id. at 159 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). To Justice
Flaherty, the majority’s suggestion that Mr. Polanco would be capable of exercising reasonable diligence in the investigation of his claim—while behind bars
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COMMENTARY

Despite the difficulty of the instant case, and the disappointing
result for the plaintiffs, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held fast
to its prior decisions that establish when statutes of limitations can
appropriately be tolled in general negligence claims. As a general
rule, only certain categories of tort claims are eligible for tolling
under the discovery rule, including medical malpractice claims,
drug product liability claims, and actions involving improvements
to real property.55 To extend the discovery rule’s applicability to all
negligence claims thus represented a step too far to the Court.
Moreover, even if the discovery rule were extended to the plaintiffs’
claims, the claims would still fall outside of the applicable statute
of limitations.56 Interestingly, the Court also found that Mr.
Polanco’s injuries accrued at his arraignment in October of 2007,
the point at which “his incarceration and its attendant harms began
to befall him” as a result of Officer Camardo’s alleged negligence.57
Thus, whether he was first made aware of his injury at his
arraignment or at his subsequent bench trial in 2008 was
ultimately immaterial, as the plaintiffs’ filing of their suit in 2012
placed either date, and the points between them, outside the statute
of limitations.
Further, the plaintiffs’ attempt to invoke Heck and the
exoneration rule were somewhat of a stretch, as the plaintiffs’
claims surrounded the alleged negligence of Officer Camardo and
did not challenge the legitimacy of Mr. Polanco’s conviction under
42 U.S.C. § 1983.58 Additionally, the failure to file a police report—
an unfortunate omission on Officer Camardo’s part—is not the type
of affirmative misrepresentation required to allow section 9-1-20 of
the Rhode Island General Laws to kick in and toll the applicable
three-year statute of limitations.59 Here again, the latest point at
which Mr. Polanco could have discovered Officer Camardo’s failure
to submit a police report was arguably at his own trial in 2008.
on the basis of faulty eyewitness testimony—was, “in and of itself, unreasonable.” See id. at 158–59.
55. Id. at 146–47 (majority opinion).
56. Id. at 147.
57. Id. at 145.
58. Id. at 152.
59. Id. at 154.
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Thus, even if Officer Camardo’s omission was sufficient to trigger
section 9-1-20, the plaintiffs’ claims would have likely still failed.
However, when it comes to the equitable tolling argument,
Justice Flaherty’s dissent should not fall on deaf ears. Unlike the
majority opinion, which quickly dismisses any suggestion that Mr.
Polanco exercised reasonably diligent efforts to investigate the
veracity of his claims, Justice Flaherty’s dissent reminds the Court
that Mr. Polanco’s ability to exercise such efforts was considerably
limited as a result of his incarceration.60 Justice Flaherty also calls
attention to the fact that Mr. Polanco’s wrongful conviction
stemmed from faulty eyewitness testimony and reiterates the
original hearing justice’s opinion that neither Mr. Polanco nor his
defense team could have discovered the existence of the two
exculpatory witnesses until they came forward in 2010.61 To
Justice Flaherty, Mr. Polanco’s knowledge that Officer Camardo
failed to file a police report could not itself “lead to a conclusion that
. . . unidentified witnesses [existed].”62 Therefore, in light of the
totality of Mr. Polanco’s extraordinary circumstances, Justice
Flaherty argued that equitable tolling of the applicable statute of
limitations was appropriate in the instant case.63 His wellreasoned argument is certainly noteworthy for future plaintiffs
suffering similar injuries.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court declined to extend the
discovery rule to general negligence claims and instead held fast to
the limits it placed upon that doctrine in its earlier jurisprudence.
The Court also held that neither Heck nor the exoneration rule
apply to state law negligence claims and are limited in their
application to claims challenging the legitimacy of criminal
convictions brought forth pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Further,
the Court held that the failure of a police officer to file a police
report does not amount to the type of affirmative misrepresentation
needed for section 9-1-20 of the Rhode Island General Laws to toll
the applicable statute of limitations in a general negligence claim.

60.
61.
62.
63.

See id. at 159 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
See id. at 157–59.
Id. at 159.
Id.
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Lastly, the Court reaffirmed that equitable tolling of applicable
statutes of limitations is not available to plaintiffs who fail to
exercise reasonable diligence to investigate the veracity of their
claims or whose circumstances do not prevent the exercise of such
efforts.
Edward A. Gencarelli, Jr.

